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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOGGAN & HALL & 
HIGGINS, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
NELSON W. HALL and 
RAYMOND C. HIGGINS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
10453 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was instituted by plaintiff, a Utah 
corpora ti on, engaged in the advertising business 
against the individual defendants who are stock-
holders of plaintiff corporation and were prior to 
March 1, 1964 officers and directors of plaintiff 
corporation, for ( 1) Injunctive relief to restrain de-
fendant from soliciting the company advertising ac-
counts, (2) For damages in the amount of $75,-
000.00, ( 3) The return of plaintiff's files and rec-
ords removed by defendants, ( 4) $500.00 owed by 
defendant Hall to plaintiff, and ( 5) Return of the 
company Plymouth automobile in the possession of 
defendant Hall or the value. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the time this law suit was commenced on 
March 11, 1964 for the relief set forth above, plain-
tiff also moved the Court for a preliminary injunr-
tion to (a) Restrain defendants from further soli-
citation of plaintiff's advertising customers, (b) To 
return all advertising data, material, and files re-
moved from the premises of plaintiff, ( c) From 
copying or in any manner using any information 
contained in said advertising data, materials, and 
files, and ( d) To compel defendant, Nelson W. Hall, 
to return a 1963 Plymouth automobile. 
On March 20 through March 23, 1964 a hear-
ing was held in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson 
on plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. 
After extensive testimony on the matter, an in-
junction was entered by the Court restraining de- , 
fendants from the further solicitation of plaintiff's 
customers and commanding defendants to return 
the files and recorps removed from the offices of 
plaintiff, except such material that as in the custom 
of the trade, was the property of the client and order-
ing the defendants not to use certain of the material 
which was developed while defendants were in the 
employ of plaintiff. Defendant Hall had returned 
the Plymouth automobile prior to the hearing on 
plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and 
this item was abandoned at the time of hearing. 
The action was tried before Judge Parley E. 
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Norseth of the Second Judicial District in Salt Lake 
County, Utah on January 21 and 22, 1965. After 
the submission of Briefs, the Court entered a Judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against defen-
dants in the amount of $25,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the Judgment in 
their favor, no cause of action, as a matter of law; 
or that failing, reversal of the Judgment and Judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, but for nominal 
damages only; or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as stated by appellants in their Brief 
are as they contend them to be and not as they must 
be stated on appeal, favorable to the Judgment of 
the lower court, hence a further statement is neces-
sary in this Brief, even though there will be some 
repetition. 
Plaintiff corporation is engaged in the adver-
tising business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Generally an advertising agency and also this 
plaintiff prepares advertising copy, distinctive slo-
gans, art work, and layouts for its customers and 
places this advertising with the media such as news-
papers, radio and television. The advertising agency 
is billed by the media and in turn bills its clients. 
For the most part, its income is derived on the 
basis of 15 per cent of the dollar volume of adver-
tising placed with the media (Ex. 15p sets forth 
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the agency procedure of the plaintiff corporation 
in detail.) . 
The plaintiff corporation was incorporated on 
March 1, 1960 and at the time of the trial of this 
action, the stock in the corporation was owned as 
follows: 
E. D. Hoggan -17,249 shares 
Nelson W. Hall- 5,246 shares 
Raymond C. Higgins - 1,000 shares 
Qualifying shares were also owned by the wives 
of Mr. Hoggan and Mr. Hall. Mr. Hoggan, Mr. Hall 
and Mr. Higgins were each officers and directors 
of the plaintiff corporation. Mr. Higgins joined the 
corporation as a stockholder, officer, and director 
in September, 1963 or approximately 6 months be-
fore the events giving rise to this law suit (R. 
229-230). 
Before incorporation in March, 1960, this ad-
vertising agency had been conducted under the part-
nership style and was composed of Mr. Hoggan and 
Mr. Hall and a Mr. Parkin. Mr. Parkin had no 
interest in the company at the time the law suit 
was commenced. 
At the end of 1963, the Boise Cascade Company, 
a large lumber manufacturer and distributor, had 
elected to place all of its advertising with its agency 
in Boise, Idaho. It withdrew its patronage from the 
plaintiff corporation. The Boise Cascade account 
was a major revenue producer for the corporation 
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and Mr. E. D. Hoggan devoted approximately 75 
per cent of his time to the advertising business of 
that account. 
After the first of the year ( 1964), Mr. Hall 
and Mr. Higgins became dissatisfied because the 
corporation showed a small loss in January (the 
profit and loss statement for February had not been 
prepared when the events giving rise to this law 
suit occurred) . 
As a result of this dissatisfaction, Mr. Higgins 
called for a meeting of the three principals (Hog-
gan, Hall & Higgins) to discuss agency affairs. The 
importance of the meetings of February 14, through 
February 18, 1964 between these principals cannot 
be underestimated and the discussion and results 
are now set forth in detail. 
Following is the testimony of Mr. Hoggan: 
"A. I recall a meeting. My recollection 
it was February 14th. A Friday evening. 
"Q. A Friday evening, February 14th? 
''A. Yes. 
'''Q. Do you keep a journal, Mr. Hog-
gan? 
"A. I do. 
"Q. And did you make notes concerning 
that meeting? 
"A. I did. 
"'Q. Now will you tell us your recollec-
tion as to what was said by the three who at-
tended that meeting? 
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"A. In the afternoon of the 14th Mr. 
Higgins asked if he and Mr. Hall might have 
a meeting with me immediately following 
work, and I said yes. We left the office around 
5 :00 o'clock and went up to Mr. Hall's apart-
ment, which was above the corporation office 
on 5th East. Mr. Higgins - I think, if I 
remember correctly - broached the subject 
that the corporation had been losing money 
during January, and it looked like we would 
face an equally heavy loss i'n February. I said 
I was very well aware of it, because I had 
worked on it with the accountant and the 
bookkeeper in regard to both months. 
"Q. What did that loss appear to be? 
"A. It at that time was between 
$1,500.00 and $1,800.00 a month. 
'"Q. What else was discussed between 
you? 
"A. Mr. Higgins said he was quite seri-
ously worried and I said: 'I see no great 
cause for alarm. This is our slow period of 
the year. It invariably has been for years.' 
On general accounts the fall and winter sea-
son are usually slow. From November through 
March. 
"Q. Has this been your past experience 
in the advertising business? 
"A. That is correct. We have always had 
a slump and faced a serious loss the first 
quarter of the year, so I said: ''I have no im-
mediate worry, although we will have to do 
something about it. We are adequately fin-
anced, and we can exist for awhile without 
anything serious happening. In the meantime 
we will solicit accounts.' I said: 'I already 
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have several good prospects.' He said 'I ac-
knowledge that, but prospects do not produce 
money. Would you be willing to take a cut 
in salary?', and I said: 'If you are talking 
about an equal cut, yes.' I said: 'I have al-
ready taken one cut, to reduce my salary 
down to the level of yours and Nels', but if 
you wish it I will take another cut, providing 
it's equal, down to $800.00 or $750.00 a 
month,' and Ray said: 'What else do we have 
to explore? Shall we reduce personnel?,' and 
I said: 'I'm perfectly willing to let two of 
the girls go. One or two.' He said : 'How 
about Mrs. Hoopes? Shall we let her go, and 
you may service her accounts?', and I said: 
'Mrs. Hoopes is a very capable employee of 
the firm. One of the most talented and ver-
satile people I have met in the advertising 
field. I wouldn't consider that. The other two 
girls, yes. But not Mrs. Hoopes. We will have 
to have people of her caliber here.' Then he 
said: 'You won't consider a cut in salary?' 
and I said: 'I will go along with whatever 
cut you and Nels propose.' He said: 'No. I 
mean you take the cut in salary,' and I said: 
'What are you thinking about?' He said: 
'You take no salary, as far as I'm concerned, 
until you're producing again,' and I said: 
'Ray, I have the biggest investment in this 
thing. This represents my lifetime savings. 
This is here for one definite purpose, and 
that's to tide us over a tough period. I in-
vested it only for that reason. To operate a 
corporation, and make a living out of it.' I 
said: 'I'm entitled to something for that,' 
and he said: 'For my money you're entitled 
to nothing.' He said: 'You're not producing, 
and consequently you deserve no money.' I 
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said: 'Do you feel the same way about it 
Nels?', and he said he ref used to take a cut 
in salary. 
"Then we discussed at some length the 
idea of what corporate reserves are for. I 
said: 'In years past, Ray, every account ex-
ecutive ever employed has lost accounts and 
never been penalized by cuts in salary. I don't 
know why I should be at this time,' and Nels 
said: 'Well, how long do you propose to draw 
this salary?' I said: 'Well, theoretically, 
Nels, I could draw it until the corporation's 
reserves are entirely exhausted and we go 
down the drain. In practicality, I have no in-
tentions to do so. I think we can have this 
thing back on its feet within three to six 
months' time' and Ray said he didn't pro-
pose to stay around and watch us lose money, 
he didn't propose to stay around and see the 
firm go bankrupt, and I said: 'I think you're 
making a foolish mistake, because the three 
of us together are much stronger than we are 
individually.' 
~'That was my reply to them, to stay, and 
Ray said: 'No, I have had enough. I'm leav-
ing. \Vhat about my accounts?', and I said: 
'Your accounts you brought in here, Ray, 
legally the firm may have some claim on them. 
Morally I don't think we have any claim at 
all, so I'll release your accounts.' He said: 
'What about my furn'iture?,' and I said: 
'Well, you turn back your stock on behalf 
of the corporation, and I'll release your furni-
ture and call it quits. Let's part as easily as 
we can, with a minimum of friction, and you 
can be on your way.' 
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"'THE COURT: Was that with Mr. 
Higgins? 
"THE WITNESS: Mr. Higgins, yes. 
"THE COURT: Thank you. 
"THE WITNESS: I said this to Mr. 
Higgins. 
"Q. Mr. Hoggan, you previously have 
been sworn as a witness in this case. When we 
finished last night the last part of your testi-
mony had to do with the conversation on the 
14th of February, and you were discussing 
and relating what was said by you to Mr. 
Higgins concerning his accounts, where you 
indicated that you had perhaps a legal cla'im 
but no moral claim on them. Will you con-
tinue from there, please? 
"A. Well, we continued the conversation 
on this vein. I was attempting to explain the 
financial stability of the organization, the fact 
that the reserves were accumulated to tide 
us over such emergencies, that previously ac-
count executives had lost accounts without 
being penalized, and that I saw no reason 
why they should demand this from me, a com-
plete lack of salary, during this period. I said 
I had made the big investment in the corpor-
ation, and my investment had carried it 
through a lot of rough times in years past. 
"Ray then stated that he saw no need for 
money. He said perhaps he had been fortun-
ate in his operation, but he saw no need for 
a tremendous amount of capital, and I said: 
'It's always been our experience that we are 
faced with a great many accounts receivable 
continuously.' I pointed out that several of 
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Mr. Hall's accounts were in arrears four and 
five months, for several thousand dollars, and 
that it was necessary that we carry at least 
part of this continuously. That we were up 
against a payroll and fixed expenses in over-
head every month. Regardless of whether the 
accounts paid us or not, those salaries had 
been paid in the past. 
"Ray still insisted that there be no salary 
drawn on my part, and I said: 'In that case, 
Ray, evidently we can't reach an agreement 
on this thing. You are not being penalized 
on this. The great loss to the company is com-
ing from my investment, which is 75%, Mr. 
Hall has taken 20 % , and you are accepting 
5 % of every dollar lost. This is not very 
great odds on your part.' 
"Ray said regardless of that he didn't 
want to stay around while the corporation 
lost money, and I said: 'Then there's only 
one thing to do. I suppose you want out?' 
He said: 'I do,' and I said: 'Then we can 
negotiate to release your furniture and fix-
tures. You will turn back in your stock, and 
let's separate as amicably as possible.' He 
said: 'What about Mr. Hall? He may want 
to leave too. What about his account?', and 
I said: 'Mr. Hall has no accounts, Ray. The 
accounts belong to the corporation. They were 
largely sold by me, my investment has fin-
anced them and I have assisted in their servic-
ing. They were all done with the intent that 
this is corporation, and that you can't separate 
the affairs of one person from another. 
They're not Mr. Hall's accounts. I stand on 
that.' 
"Ray then said he had a dinner engage-
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ment - it was then nearly 8 :00 o'clock, we 
had been three hours in session - and I 
said: 'Well, I would like to stay and talk with 
Mr. Hall.' He said: 'It looks like we have 
finished our affairs, and the argument now 
is between you and Mr. Hall.' I said it was 
no argument. I merely wanted to stay and 
talk with Mr. Hall, and get a few other things 
straightened out. He excused himself in the 
neighborhood of a quarter to 8 :00 o'clock, 
and I stayed and talked with Mr. Hall. 
"The jist of the conversation was that I 
asked, I said: 'You understand what I'm get-
ting at, Nels, in relation to this financial situ-
ation?' He said: 'I do perfectly. But Ray,' 
Mr. Higgins: 'does not. He says every time 
you mention financing he gets mad, because 
he doesn't understand it.' 'Well,' I said: 'that 
being the case, he evidently [doesn't] belong 
in agency management. If he cannot appreci-
ate profit and loss, depreciation, and all these 
other factors.' 'Well, he said: 'you have got 
to give him his own way, or the whole thing 
will crash down.' I said: 'Nels, in all con-
science I can't give him his own way. If I 
step down now, and turn over the manage-
ment of this corporation to Ray, then I'm 
finished. I have had it completely. I don't pro-
pose to do that. There is nothing legally or 
morally that can force me to do it.' I said: 
'I intend upon remaining as manager of this 
corporation, and as such I will continue to 
draw a salary.' I said: 'I don't understand 
your feeling in this regard, because I think 
you will admit that I have always treated 
you fairly and honestly in all of our trans-
actions.' 
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"He admitted that I had, the conversation 
was continued for a short time longer, and 
the telephone rang. I was close to it and I 
answered it. Mr. Higgins was on the phone, 
and he asked to speak to Mr. Hall. Then Ml'. 
Hall said: 'You'll have to excuse me. We 
have a dinner date with Mr. and Mrs. Hig-
gins.' So I excused myself at that time and 
left. That was still on the evening of the 14th 
of February. 
"Q. All right. Did you have a further 
conversation with Mr. Hall the following day? 
"A. The following day was Saturday. I 
came down to work at about 9 :30. My wife 
dropped me off at the office and went down-
town. I was there for approximately an hour, 
the telephone rang, and it was a personal call 
for Mr. Hall. He had an extension telephone 
from the main telephone in the office and I 
transferred it upstairs, and after the light 
had gone off on the phone I dialed Mr. Hall 
and asked if he would like to talk. He said 
he had just gotten out of bed and he couldn't 
come down, but if I would come up he would 
be glad to make me a cup of coffee. 
"Q. Did you have a conversation with 
him at that place and at that time? 
"A. Yes. I went up to his apartment, 
and I tried to talk. Nels was quite non-com-
municative. I asked him if he'd made up his 
mind what he was going to do, and he said he 
had not. That was the sum and substance of 
that conversation. 
"Q. All right. Now did you have a fur-
ther conversation with Mr. Higgins and Mr. 
12 
Hall subsequent to that Saturday, concerning 
the affairs of the corporation? 
"A. Nothing on Monday. I was in Ogden 
on a business call, a prospect, and returned 
at 1 :30. There was nothing said there. On 
Monday. On Tuesday Mrs. Hoopes, Mr. Park-
in and I went out to the south area of the 
County on another prospect call, and we re-
turned about 11 :00. I would say somewhere 
around 3 :00 in the afternoon Mr. Higgins 
asked me if we could have another meeting. 
"Q. What day was this again? 
"'A. That was on Tuesdav. That would 
be the 18th. ~ 
"Q. All right. And did you have a meet-
ing that evening? 
A. We had a meeting that evening. 
"Q. Who was present besides the three 
of you? 
"A. At 5 :00 o'clock. Mr. Hall, Mr. Hig-
gins and myself. 
"Q. All right. What was discussed at 
that time? 
"A. It was a very short meeting. Mr. 
Higgins announced that Mr. Hall was leav-
ing. I expressed my regrets, and I said: "Wh3:t 
about the accounts?' He said: 'We have 
those all locked in." 
"Q. Who said that? 
"A. Mr. Higgins. And I said: 'Is this 
true, Nels?' He said: 'Yes, we have the busi-
ness.' 
"Q. What else was said? 
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"A. I said : 'When did you do this? 
When did you make up your mind?' He said· 
'I talked to you Saturday. Subsequent to Sat~ 
urday.' I said: 'What have you been doing?' 
and he said: 'We have been out getting these 
accounts lined up.' I said: 'Well, I can't be-
lieve it. I can't believe that you'd be that short-
sighted and stupid.' He said: 'What is wrong 
with that?' I said: 'Well, you're conspiring 
to destroy your own corporation for one thing. 
You're soliciting the accounts of the busi-
ness,' and I said : 'I take a very very dim 
view of this thing.' 
"Then Mr. Higgins said: 'Why don't you 
face it, Ned? You have had it.' He said: 'We 
have all the business, and all you have left 
is this bunch of old furniture downstairs and 
some money in the bank.' He said: 'Why don't 
you be a good guy, and buy Nels out and re-
lease him? We'll be on our way, and we'll 
bear you no hard feelings at all.' I said: 
'That is very generous of you. I'm not in any 
position to buy Nels out. I don't intend to go 
out of business, nor do I intend to dissolve 
the corporation. It would take a great many 
months to collect all of our accounts receiv-
able and dispose of the other assets, and I 
don't propose to do this.' He said: 'Well, you 
won't give us an answer now?' I said: 'Of 
course I won't give you an answer now. You 
have evidently taken some time in making up 
your mind as to what you were going to do, 
and I'm going to ask the same considera-
tion ... ' (R-233-242)." 
'The testimony of Mr. Hall and Mr. Higgins 
concerning the meetings does not vary materially 
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from the testimony of Mr. Hoggan which has been 
quoted extensively above. Neither of the defendants 
deny that they had informed Mr. Hogan that they 
had the accounts and Mr. Hall testified: 
"Q. Did you make a statement - specific-
ally, or in substance - that you had the 
accounts, and were taking them with 
you? 
"A. In substance, that I knew accounts were 
corning with me. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hall, by that 
time you had agreements with these peo-
ple? By that I mean their assent to go 
with you? Is that correct? 
"A. I had an understanding that some were 
coming with me, yes." ( R. 132) 
Mr. Hall contacted five of the six accounts on 
Monday, February 17, 1964. It will be noted that 
at this time, Mr. Hall had not advised anyone of 
his decision to leave the corporation and, in fact, 
had informed Mr. Hoggan that he did not know 
what he would do. Only after he had obtained assur-
ances that the accounts he had been servicing would 
go with him when he left the plaintiff corporation, 
did he announce that he had been contacting the ac-
counts and that he intended to leave the plaintiff 
corporation. 
Obviously his decision to leave the plaintiff was 
prompted by his good fortune in having obtained 
the advertising business of these accounts. Thus em-
boldened he announced to Mr. Hoggan that he was 
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leaving and taking the business with him (R. 131-
132.) 
Although Mr. Hall throughout the course of the 
proceedings in this law suit has consistently attempt-
ed to cast the impression that he did not solicit and 
ask for the advertising business that he took with 
him, his own testimony and the testimony of those 
he solicited points unerringly to the conclusion that 
on Monday the 17th day of February, 1964, Mr. 
Hall contacted five of the six accounts he had been 
servicing for the purpose of obtaining their busi-
ness. 
Most important is the testimony of Mr. Hall in 
regard to the solicitation of the Salt Lake Mattress 
Company. Mr. Hall testified: 
"Q. Will you relate your conversation - at 
the time that you contacted Mr. Eber-
hardt, of Salt Lake Mattress Company 
- wherein you advised him that you 
were leaving the plaintiff corporation? 
"A. This was substantially the same conver-
sation that I had had with the previous 
accounts. Outlining the difficulties at the 
agency. The loss that had been incurred. 
The fact that Mr. Higgins was leaving. 
That Mr. Hoggan had no accounts. That 
we were in a s'erious position, and that I 
was leaving. Then I asked Mr. Eber-
hardt if he would like me to continue 
to service his account. Now do you want 
Mr. Eberhardt's reply?" 
Mr. James Eberhardt, co-owner of Salt Lake 
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Mattress whose account had been serviced by sever-
al advertising men employed by plaintiff over a 
six-year period including Mr. Hall, testified to the 
meeting with Mr. Hall as follows: 
"Q. Tell us what was said by each of you 
at that time. 
"A. Mr. Hall said that Mr. Hoggan had lost 
his big account, and was drawing on the 
agency. That he and Mr. Higgins were 
carrying the load, in essence, and that 
he was breaking away from Mr. Hoggan 
and the agency that was set up, and 
wanted to know if we'd go along with the 
proposition. At the same time he also 
stated that most of the accounts he had 
contacted were going along with him. 
That in essence is what he said." (R. 
183) 
We may correctly distill from this testimony 
and particularly that of Mr. Hall that he had the 
same conversation with each of the accounts he con-
tacted and asked each of them for their advertising 
business. 
Also Mr. Hall testified that before he left the 
agency at the end of February, 1964, the accounts 
he had contacted had "agreed" that he could con-
tinue to service the accounts (R. 135). 
Of further importance to the evidence in this 
case concerning the scheme of solicitation practiced 
by defendants is the testimony of those solicited. 
Mr. Charles Freed testified: 
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"A. Well he informed me that he and Ned 
Hoggan were splitting up. They would 
no longer be together." (R. 280) 
Mr. Allan E. Brockbank testified: 
"A. Mr. Hall came to my office and told me 
that the organization was going to be 
divided and that he and Mr. Higgins 
were going to form a new organiza-
tion." (R.270) 
Mr. Peter Wilson of Wilson Transport Supply 
testified: 
"A. In effect he said that there was going 
to be a separation between he and Mr. 
Hoggan, and that I should make a choice 
as to which of the gentlemen should 
handle our account, or where I wanted 
to place the advertising in the future." 
(R. 288) 
Mr. Tony Hatsis testified: 
"A. Mr. Hall came to me, I think it was the 
middle or early part of February and 
says that they were going to split, and 
he asked me what I wanted to do, and I 
says, 'Wherever you go, I want you to 
handle my advertising. You are the man 
that put yourself out for me. You are the 
man that has done all this work.' And I 
wanted him to continue my advertising." 
(R. 313) 
In each instance the plain implication was made 
that the agency was being divided or split up. This, 
of course, was not true as there had never been 
any conversation between the officers, directors and 
stockholders of the corporatfon concerning its dis-
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solution. Also the thought was implanted in the 
minds of the advertising accounts that the agency 
was in financial trouble. True it had sustained 
a small loss in January, but this was nothing ac-
cording to Mr. Hoggan that could not be expected 
at that time of year or replaced by a mutual effort 
of the principals. 
Mr. Hall and Mr. Higgins remained officers, 
directors, and employees of the plaintiff corpora-
tion until the last day of February, 1964. As noted 
above, they had obtained the advertising business 
of these customers of plaintiff while still employees, 
officers, and directors of plaintiff corporation. They 
discussed formation of a new organization on Feb-
ruary 19th (R. 118). Later in February, but before 
they had tendered their notices of resignation, they 
formed a new corporation styled as Higgins & Hall 
and by March 1, 1964, the new agency was in busi-
ness. At about this time (February 29, 1964) de-
fendants Higgins and Hall entered the office of the 
plaintiff corporation and removed therefrom all of 
its files and records relating to the accounts that 
they took with them. This was one of the subjects 
of the hearing on preliminary injunction which oc-
curred within a few weeks thereafter and much of 
this material was ordered to be returned to the 
plaintiff. 
However, the defendant Hall was not at that 
time through interfering with the business of the 
plaintiff corporation. In the month of February, 
19 
1964 he had orally agreed on behalf of the plaintiff 
corporation to a 13-week extension of certain con-
tracts at KSL-TV for advertising broadcast time. 
Thereafter on the 9th day of April 1964 at a time 
when he was no longer an employee of the plaintiff 
corporation, he executed on behalf of plaintiff cor-
poration, an agreement with KSL-TV cancelling the 
13-week contract on behalf of the plaintiff corpor-
ation and executing a new contract on behalf of 
Higgins & Hall for the balance of the 13-week 
period. These contracts were the property of the 
plaintiff corporation. They had been entered into 
for a period of 13 weeks with the first broadcast 
date February 18, 1964. They were to run there-
after for a full period of 13 weeks. Billing on these 
contracts would be to the agency that let the con-
tract and in turn they would derive a comm'ission 
on the placement of this advertising time. Obviously 
Mr. Hall found that he could not get this revenue 
after he left the plaintiff's employ unless and until 
new contracts were written. Not only did he enter 
into these contracts without authority on behalf of 
the plaintiff corporation, but in clear violation of 
the Court Order. (R. 177, 178 and Ex. 5-8). 
Mr. Hall testified: 
"Q. Were you aware that you were under a 
Court Order not to interfere with the 
contracts of the plaintiff corporation 
on April 9, 1964? 
"A. Yes. (R. 142) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS THAT DEFEND-
ANTS SOLICITED PLAINTIFF'S ADVERTISING CUS-
TOMERS INCLUDING WILSON TRANSPORT SUPPLY, 
BEFORE LEAVING PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOY. 
Defendants argue under Point I of their brief 
that the evidence was not sufficient to support the 
Court's finding that they solicited the advertising 
business of plaintiff, except that they admit that 
they solicited the account of Wilson Transport Sup-
ply. In this regard, defendants cite the evidence 
of defendant Hall and the testimony of Charles 
Freed, Alan E. Brockbank, Tony Hatsis, and Frank 
Shelley. 
On the contrary, while Mr. Hall's solicitations 
were subtle, they were nonetheless designed to take 
from plaintiff the advertising accounts he had been 
servicing while an employee of plaintiff. By delib-
erate mis-statement of facts and by taking full ad-
vantage of the intimate relationship he had with 
each of the accounts, he obtained their advertising 
business before he left plaintiff's employ. 
There can be no doubt as to why he contacted 
these accounts on February 17, 1964. He made his 
purpose perfectly clear in his testimony. 
Mr. Hall: 
"Q. Is it you testimony then that the deci-
sion to contact the accounts and to se-
cure their business was your own? 
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"A. Yes." 
"Q. Did you also form a conscious desire to 
take your accounts that you had been 
servicing with you when you left? 
"A. This would have been a natural reac. 
tion, yes. ( R. 122) " 
"Q. Now prior to the end of February, 1964 
you considered that the business that 
went with you was yours, did you not? 
"A. Yes ( R. 143) ." 
There can be no question that Mr. Hall's intent 
was to purposely set out to divert plaintiff's busi-
ness to himself. The testimony above adequately 
shows this purpose. 
We come now to his method of executing this 
intended plan. In the case of Mr. Eberhardt at Salt 
Lake Mattress and Mr. Wilson of Wilson Transport 
Supply, the defendant Hall asked them for their 
business in so many words. This is admitted by 
defendants (Pre-trial Order - R. 18). 
CONTENTAL REALTY (Brockbank Organiz-
ations) 
In this case Mr. Hall explained to Mr. Brock· 
bank that the plaintiff corporation had financial 
problems, that Mr. Higgins had announced his in· 
tention to leave, that the agency was losing money, 
and that he (Hall) couldn't continue in that sort 
of an operation and that he was leaving also. 
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FREED MOTOR COMPANY 
Here again Mr. Hall enumerated the financial 
difficulties of the plaintiff corporation, it was los-
ing money, that it would continue to lose money, 
that Mr. Hoggan had refused to take no salary or 
at least a substantial cut in salary (meeting of 
February 14, 1964), and that he was leaving the 
agency (R. 120, 121, 122). He also left the impres-
sion with Mr. Freed that he and Mr. Hoggan were 
splitting up ( R. 177) . 
CLUB MANHATTAN - HOFBRAU 
Mr. Hall met Mr. Hatsis as he had the others 
on the 17th day of February, 1964 (Hall) testified: 
"Q. State what you said to Mr. Hatsis. Not 
relating to what he said. 
"A. I told Mr. Hatsis I was leaving the or-
ganization I was with, and I asked what 
he would like to do. ( R. 160)" 
Here again a direct solicitation. 
COUNTRY MUTUAL LIFE 
Mr. Frank Shelley was not contacted until 
March 2, 1964, but here again is evidence of a 
direct attempt to divert the plaintiff's customers. 
"Q. Relate what you said to Mr. Shelley at 
that time without stating what he said 
to you. 
"A. I told Mr. Shelley I was no longer with 
the former organization, but I was now 
with a corporation known as Higgins & 
Hall. I gave him my address and I asked 
if I could continue to service his ac-
count (R. 165-166) ." 
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Of these six accounts, five were contacted on 
the 17th day of February, 1964 by Mr. Hall for the 
purpose of obtaining their business when he left 
the plaintiff corporation. At that time he either 
directly asked for their business or conveyed to 
them the impression that he and Mr. Hoggan were 
splitting up because the corporation was beset with 
severe financial problems that would make it un-
able to continue business. Naturally no one wants 
to do business with a company that is going broke. 
An advertising agency places its advertising with 
the media; is billed by the media; and in turn bills 
its accounts. If in fact, the plaintiff corporation 
was in the serious financial condition that Mr. 
Hall described, then that account would have no 
choice, but to seek a new agency. Since Mr. Hall 
had achieved a very intimate relationship with each 
of these accounts, their decision to go with him was, 
of course, predictable. He also implied that he and 
Mr. Hoggan were splitting up. However, he had 
never been requested to leave plaintiff's employ; 
the decision was his own. Further the evidence does 
not show that plaintiff corporation was in the dire 
financial situation that Mr. Hall led the accounts 
to believe. True it had suffered a small loss in 
January, 1964, but there is evidence that these 
losses would diminish and in fact the plaintiff 
corporation was still in business as E. D. Hoggan 
& Associates at the time of the trial of this action. 
As to the Allan E. Brockbank Organizati'ons, 
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Mr. Hall knew or should have known that the men-
tion of financial disaster would have the desired 
effect of getting the account. Mr. Brockbank testi-
fied that his account needed to be financed by the 
advertising agency and if it wasn't so financed, 
he could no longer remain with that agency ( R. 
275). Mr. Hall also left the impression with these 
accounts that they were "dividing up" the old 
agency. The implication was that each was taking 
certain accounts and going their separate ways. 
Here again there is no evidence of any agreement 
on behalf of these parties. Certainly the solicitation 
made by defendant Hall was done without the 
knowledge or consent of plaintiff. 
All of the evidence of the solicitation by Hall 
shows that he either directly asked for the business 
or very subtly implied to the account that he had 
a right to their business because the agency was 
dividing up or that their account would suffer if 
they did not go with him because of the financial 
condition of the plaintiff. His purpose was clear 
and the execution of his plan produced the desired 
results. 
The law does not support him in this endeavor, 
but rather condemns his methods and gives rise 
to an actionable wrong. 
In Re-statement, (2d), Agency, Section 393, 
in ( e) it is stated: 
"PREPARATION F 0 R COMPETITION 
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AFTER TERMINATION OF AGENCY. 
After the termination of his agency, in the 
absence of a restrictive agreement, the agent 
can properly compete with his principal as to 
matters for which he has been employed. See 
Section 396. Even before the termination of 
the agency, he is entitled to make arrange-
ments to compete, except that he cannot pro-
perly use confidential information peculiar 
to his employer's business and acquired there-
in. Thus, before the end of his employment 
he can properly purchase a rival busines~ 
and upon termination of employment imme-
diately compete. He is not, however, entitled 
to solicit customers for such rival business 
before the end of his employment nor can he 
properly do other similar acts in direct com-
petition with the employer's business." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
The evidence 'in this case shows that the de-
fendant Hall, and on one occasion the defendant 
Higgins, in regard to Wilson Transport Supply, 
solicited the business of plaintiff's customers be-
fore they had terminated their employment with 
plaintiff. In this, they violated the rule of the Re-
statement and the law of all jurisdictions that have 
had occasion to pass on this question. 
The only other case as far as is known to ever 
reach a court of last resort concerning the identical 
situation presented to the court in the case at bar 
is the case of Duane Jones Company, Inc. vs. Burke 
et al, 117 N.E. 2d 237 (New York) (1954). It 
had before it the case wherein the plaintiff adver-
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tising agency brought action against certain of its 
former officers and employees and against a new 
advertising agency formed by them for damages 
arising out of the plaintiff's loss of business which 
business had been pre-empted by the former officers 
when they left the agency. The Duane Jones Ad-
vertising Agency was organized in 1942 by Mr. 
Jones who was an experienced advertising execu-
tive and was its majority stockholder. By 1951 the 
agency had acquired accounts in such number and 
quality as produced a gross billing of $9,000,000.00. 
Then in 1951 the agency 1'ost three of its accounts 
with a total annual billing of $6,500,000.00 and 
certain of the executives and staff members had 
resigned from the organization. In June of 1951 
a meeting was called by a number of plaintiff's 
officers and directors and employees wherein Mr. 
Jones was told that he should either sell his interest 
in plaintiff corporation or the personnel involved 
would resign en masse and form a new agency. He 
was also advised that the agency's customers had 
been ''already pre-sold" on the idea of joining a 
new agency. Negotiations for the sale of Mr. Jones' 
stock did not materialize and in August and Sep-
tember of 1951, a number of the officers and em-
ployes of the plaintiff corporation left and joined 
the new agency which was a corporation they had 
recently formed. Prior to leaving, they solicited 
and obtained a substantial number of plaintiff's 
customers and shortly after the new corporation 
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was organized, it was servicing the advertising busi-
ness of these customers. 
Plaintiff filed the action seeking damages from 
the defendants sustained as a result of a conspiracy 
by them to deprive plaintiff of its principal custom-
ers and certain of its key employees. Many of the 
rulings of the New York Court are applicable to 
this case concerning all points raised by the appel-
lants in the case at bar including solicitation, proxi-
mate cause, and damages. Respondent cites the fol-
lowing pertinent observations of the New York 
Court: 
"The foregoing evidence has led us to con-
clude that the conduct of the individual de-
fendants-appellants as officers, directors or 
employees of the plaintiff corporation '* * * 
fell below the standard required by the law 
of one acting as an agent or employee of an-
other.' Lamdin vs. Broadway Surface Adv. 
Corp., 272 N. Y. 133, 138, 5 N.E. 2d 66, 67. 
Each of these defendants was '* * * prohibit-
ed from acting in any manner inconsistent 
with his agency or trust and [was] at all 
times bound to exercise the utmost good faith 
and loyalty in the performance of his duties.' 
272 N.Y. at Page 138, 5 N.E. 2d at Page 67. 
Plaintiff's evidence - which the jury appar-
ently believed - established that on June 28, 
1951, the individual defendants-appellants 
met and agreed to take over the business of 
the plaintiff agency, either by purchase of the 
controlling interest in the corporation or by 
resignation en masse and the formation of a 
new agency; that at that meeting it was pro-
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posed that the defendants contact plaintiff's 
customers whose advertising accounts were 
then being serviced by the defendants as ac-
count executives of plaintiff, with reference 
to prospective control of plaintiff's business 
by the individual defendants; that on July 
3rd the employee-defendants offered to pur-
chase, at a fixed price, the controlling inter-
est in plaintiff agency and stated that, if 
the off er were not accepted, they would re-
sign and that plaintiff's customers had been 
'presold' on the proposed action ; that a day 
or two after termination of unsuccessful 
negotiation for their purchase of the stock, 
the defendants who were officers and direc-
tors submitted to plaintiff their resignations 
from those positions, all (save one) of which 
resignations were received by plaintiff on the 
same day and were in substantially identical 
form; that three of the individual defendants 
immediately commenced negotiations leading 
to the incorporation of August 23rd of a rival 
advertising agency which agency commenced 
operations on September 10th; that on or 
about the time it commenced business, the 
defendant agency had as its customers 
nine accounts formerly serviced by plaintiff 
and employed more than 50 per cent of plain-
tiff's personnel; that the accounts and per-
sonnel were acquired through solicitation by, 
or at the direction of, the individual defen-
dants prior to or during the period when they 
were completing their duties as empl'Oyees of 
plaintiff; and finally, that the rival agency 
was formed and the accounts and personnel 
were solicited without disclosure of such ac-
tivities to plaintiff. 
"The inferences reasonably to be drawn from 
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the record justify the conclusion - reached 
b~ ~h~ jury and a ma~ori~~ of the Appellate 
D1v1s1on - that the ind1v1dual defendants. 
appellants, while employees of plaintiff cor. 
poration determined upon a course of con-
duct which, when subsequently carried out 
resulted in benefit to themselves through de~ 
struction of plaintiff's business, in violation 
of the fiduciary duties of good faith and fair 
dealing imposed on defendants by their close 
relationship with plaintiff corporation. The 
jury's determination of those questions of 
fact - affirmed by the Appellate Division 
- is beyond our power to disturb. 'If con-
flicting inferences are possible as to abuse or 
opportunity, the trier of the facts must make 
the choice between them. There can be no re-
vision in this court unless the choice is clear-
ly wrong.' Meinhard vs. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 
458, 467, 164 N.E. 545, 548, 62 A.L.R. l." 
A $300,000.00 verdict in favor of plaintiff 
against defendants was affirmed on appeal. 
Applicable, also is the fact in the Duane Jones' 
case at least one of the accounts was solicited after 
the defendants terminated their employ. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DE· 
FENDANT HIGGINS PARTICIP~TED IN THE COM· 
MISSION OF THE TORT AGAINST PLAINTIFF. 
The lower court found that Mr. Higgins assist· 
ed Mr. Hall in the solicitation of the plaintiff's cus-
tomers and was equally liable to plaintiff corpor· 
a ti on. 
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In his Brief, defendant Higgins charges that 
there is not sufficient evidence to show that he acted 
in concert with Mr. Hall for the solicitation of plain-
tiff's customers and, therefore, that he is innocent 
and that the liability, if any, in this case belonged 
to defendant Hall. 
While the conduct of defendant Higgins is not 
as flagrant in this case as that of defendant Hall, 
it is nonetheless tortious and he is jointly respons-
ible with defendant Hall. 
He first of all concedes that during the week 
of February 17, 1964 he visited Mr. Peter Wilson 
of Wilson Transport Supply and assisted Mr. Hall 
in the solicitation of that account (R. 217). Im-
portant to his liability is the fact that he then knew 
that Mr. Hall had contacted the other accounts and 
knew that they were coming with him and he and 
Mr. Hall had also by that time (February 19) 
discussed the formation of a new advertising agency 
in which he would participate. Before each had ter-
minated his employment with the plaintiff corpor-
ation, the corporation of Higgins & Hall had been 
formed and was in business on March 1, 1964. 
The evidence further shows according to the 
testimony of Mr. Hoggan that the attempted de-
struction of the plaintiff corporation was a joint 
affair on behalf of both Mr. Hall and Mr. Higgins. 
Mr. Hoggan testified: 
"A. It was a very short meeting. Mr. Hig-
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gins announced that Mr. Hall was leav. 
ing. I expressed my regrets and I said: 
'What abount the accounts?' He said: 
'We have those all locked in.'" (R. 241) 
. . . "Then Mr. Higgins said : 'Why don't 
you face it Ned. You have had it.' He 
said : 'We have all the business and all 
you have left is this bunch of old furni-
ture downstairs and some money in the 
bank.' He said: 'Why don't you be a good 
guy and buy Nels out and release him~ 
We'll be on our way and we'll bear you 
no hard feelings at all.' " 
Mr. Higgins never denied that these statements 
were made by him to Mr. Hoggan and, of course, 
it showed without question a joint action or agree-
ment on the part of the two defendants. No other 
connotation can be put on the word ~'we" when Mr. 
Higgins states, "We have the accounts locked in." 
And "We have the business." 
The rule is set forth in 16 Am. Jur. 2d Con· 
spiracy, Section 48: 
"JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. Each 
act done in pursuance of the conspiracy by 
one of several conspirators is, in contempla· 
ti on of law, an act for which each is jointly 
and severally liable. This joint and several 
liability of a conspirator applies to damages 
accruing prior to his joining the conspiracy 
as well as damages thereafter resulting, and 
regardless of whether he took a prominent or 
an inconspicuous part in the execution of the 
conspiracy. This liability of each member of 
a conspiracy for the damage resulting there· 
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from exists whether or not the conspirator 
profited from the result of the conspiracy. 
Before a person who joins an existing con-
spiracy will be held liable for what was pre-
viously done pursuant to the conspiracy, how-
ever, it must be shown that he joined the con-
spiracy with knowledge of the unlawfulness 
of its object or of the means contemplated. 
And a conspirator who withdraws from a 
conspiracy is not responsible for subsequent 
acts committed by his former confederates." 
The above rule illustrates the principle that 
one joining the conspiracy is liable for damages 
accruing prior to the time that he joined if it is 
shown that he joined with knowledge of the unlaw-
fulness of its object or the means contemplated to 
accomplish the objective. Mr. Higgins is legally 
charged with the knowledge that his duty to his 
corporation, the plaintiff, was that of a fiduciary 
and the attempted destruction of the corporation 
by he and Mr. Hall was unlawful. 
A case in point is De Vries vs. Brumback, 349 
P. 2d 532 (Cal.). This was an action on conversion 
against defendant who obtained some jewelry that 
had been stolen from the plaintiff. This defendant 
did not join in the conspiracy until some time after 
the robbery had been committed, but he did know of 
the robbery and took into his possession the greater 
part of the stolen property. Defendant argued that 
he could not be responsible for the full amount be-
cause the full amount had not ~ome into his posses-
sion. The Court notes the distinction between the 
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crime of conspiracy and the tort of conspiracy hold. 
Ing: 
~'~e~e the findings established that appellant, 
within a few hours after the robbery, joined 
the continuing conspiracy to convert and with 
full knowledge of the prior acts of his co-con-
spirators, actively participated in the overall 
purpose to convert all of the stolen property 
to their use and benefit. As such act of par-
ticipant, appellant was a joint tort feasor 
liable for the entire damage done in pursu-
ance of the common design. In such circum. 
stances, the question of whether or not all or 
part of the unrecovered stolen property ever 
came into appellant's personal possession is 
immaterial." 
It would have been otherwise in a criminal case 
wherein a person could not have been held respon-
sible for those acts committed to the time he joined 
the conspiracy. 
On the above facts and law defendant Higgins 
is fully liable to plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF WAS 
CAUSED BY DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT AND THE 
COUR'T PROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES THERE· 
FOR. 
Defendants argue under their Point III that 
no loss was caused to plaintiff by their wrongful 
conduct because the accounts in question would have 
left plaintiff anyway; and their conduct could not, 
then be the proximate cause of loss. 
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The fallacy of this argument may be demon-
strated by analogy. Assume a person afflicted with 
a fatal disease. Assume also that this person is 
killed by the wrongful act of a third person. Could 
that third person successfully argue that he could 
avoid the payment of damages because the dead per-
son was not going to live much longer anyway? 
Would a person be any less guilty of murder if his 
victim was afflicted with a fatal illness? 
But further, consideration of the evidence and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom will show that 
causation is not the problem in this case that de-
fendants would have the court believe. 
Mr. Hall testified that he did not need the 
business of these accounts because he was free to 
leave the plaintiff any time he chose and that he 
possessed skills that he could sell in the market 
place at any time (R. 120, 121). 
Mr. Higgins testified that he welcomed Mr. 
Hall as an associate whether he brought any busi-
ness or not (R. 214). 
Why then, was it necessary for these two gentle-
men to solicit the advertising business of these ac-
counts? The reason, of course, is that they were not 
at all sure that this business would automatically fol-
low their departure and it was necessary for Mr. 
Hall to exercise the advertising skills he possessed to 
make sure that when he left he would have the busi-
ness ~'locked in". As noted above he did this by taking 
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full advantage of the intimate association he had 
with the client and by casting the impression that 
plaintiff was in dire financial straits; and that he 
and Mr. Hogan were splitting up. This disparity of 
image created by Mr. Hall made the decision of 
the client to go with him easily predictable. 
Had these defendants possesed even the most 
primitive sense of business ethics and had they ob-
served even the most rudimentary rules of the fidu-
ciary relation legally imposed upon them as direc-
tors of pla:intiff corporation this lawsuit would not 
have resulted. They would have informed Mr. Hog-
gan of their decision to leave and the subject of the 
accounts would have naturally arisen. Plaintiff 
would then have had the opportunity to present to 
the client evidence of its financial ability, continu· 
i ty of service and new advertising ideas and pro-
grams. Mr. Hall would have the same opportunity. 
Under these circumstances the client could have 
made an intelligent choice, and an actionable wrong 
would not have been committed. 
Under the proper circumstances outlined above 
we do not know what the clients would have done. 
This point is illustrated by the testimony of Mr. 
Wilson of Wilson Transport Supply. 
"Q. 
"A. 
What difference would it have made in 
your decision, had he not held any dis· 
cussion with you in respect to this mat· 
ter at all? 
Well, that is a difficult question. If he 
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--
hadn't had any discussion and had left 
the agency, I'm not too sure whether 
he would have continued to or whether 
he wouldn't have. It's a difficult ques-
tion to ask. I mean to answer." (R. 289) 
Mr. Wilson is referring to whether he would have 
stayed with Mr. Hall absent solicitation. 
Defendants cite with emphasis the case of 
Nichols-Morris v. Morris, 17 4 F. Supp. 691, S.D.N.Y. 
in support of their theory on causation. Plaintiff 
cites the case with equal emphasis. The court found 
in that case that defendant solicited the business of 
Nichols-Miller a customer of the plaintiff corpor-
ation, while defendant was still an officer and di-
rector of plaintiff. It further found that the busi-
ness of this customer was cancellable and would un-
doubtedly be cancelled and awarded to defendant 
when he terminated his employment without any 
inducement on his part. Nonetheless, the court found 
that defendant had breached his duty toward plain-
tiff and awarded plaintiff judgment in the amount 
of $22,500.00. Had the court followed the novel 
theory advanced by defendant in this case, the court 
could not have awarded damages because the loss 
was not proximately caused by defendant's wrong-
ful conduct. 
A case of greater import is again that of Duane 
Jones Co., Inc. v. Burke, et al. (supra). As to caus-
ation the court held : 
"Defendants-appellants also urge as a basis 
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for reversal of the judgment rendered against 
them, that plaintiff failed sufficiently to es. 
tablish a causal relationship between damages 
sustained by plaintiff and the alleged wrong. 
ful conduct by the defendants. For this argu. 
ment defendants rely upon ( 1) The fact that 
none of the accounts were under contract to 
plaintiff agency, and (2) The fact that there 
is evidence of record from which it may in-
f erred that plaintiff had "resigned" all of 
its accounts in August, 1951, prior to the soJi. 
citation of such accounts by the individual de-
fendants. Plaintiff was not required to show 
interference by defendants with existing con. 
tractual relationships in order to impose Ji. 
ability in the present action. (Citing cases). 
As was said in Keviczky v. Lorber, 290 N.Y. 
297, 306, 49 N.E.2d 146, 150, 146 A.L.R. 
1410: 'An injury to a person's business by 
procuring others not to deal with him or by 
getting away his customers, if unlawful 
means are employed, such as fraud or intimi· 
dation, or if done without justifiable cause. 
is an actionable wrong.' 2 Cooley on Torts 
Sec. 230. Moreover, there is evidence of rec· 
ord from which the jury might have inferred 
that the loss of customers suffered by plain· 
tiff in August and September, 1951, was .t~e 
direct result of defendants-appellants' actlVI· 
ties immediately prior thereto. Plaintiff in: 
traduced evidence of the customers it had 
serviced for varying periods of time prior .to 
June 28, 1951, and which it was then serv1c· 
ing; it established activities by defendanti 
as to demands made upon plaintiff to sur· 
render the business to defendants, accomp· 
anied by threats of mass resignation pursu· 
ant to a scheme reputed to have been 'pre 
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sold' to the customers; it proved solicitation 
by defendants of plaintiff's accounts and per-
sonnel, and, finally, it established a mass ex-
odus to the corporate defendant of plaintiff's 
customers and a majority of its key person-
nel. Upon that state of the record, the jury 
was entitled to find that plaintiff's losses 
were a proximate result of defendants' con-
duct." 
The evidence 'in this record closely parallels 
that of the Duane Jones case and compels the same 
result. 
POINT IV. 
THE DAMAGES AW ARD ED 'TO PLAINTIFF 
WERE BASED UPON CORRECT PRINCIPLES OF 
LAW. 
Appellants argue ( 1) That the gross receipts 
of the advertising accounts and Hall's present salary 
are not proper elements of damage, and (2) Plain-
tiff suffered no loss of profits and, therefore, suf-
fered no damage. 
Defendants argue at length by reference to 
the financial statements of the plaintiff that the 
accounts in question would not have produced any 
profit for plaintiff. However, Mr. Hall was re-
ceiving a salary of $1,100.00 a month while in plain-
tiff's employ and all of their accounting is based on 
that salary. This is basic to their premise and it is 
faulty. Had the accounts remained with the plaintiff, 
they could have been serviced by less expensive 
help or by the remaining principal, Mr. Hoggan 
Defendants' argument must fail for another reason, 
namely that they argue that in addition to Mr. 
39 
Hall's salary of $1,100.00 a month, there must be 
added $8,118.00 for overhead and the combination 
of these two figures is greater than the gross rev. 
enue produced by the accounts for the year 1963. 
There is no evidence as to which portion of the 
overhead is applicable to these accounts. Defendan~ 
have simply attempted to spread the overhead pro. 
rata and obviously this cannot be done in any busi. 
ness without a detailed cost accounting. 
In considering the elements of damage in this 
case the court should be mindful that although de. 
fendants Higgins and Hall were employees of plain-
tiff and subject to the duties legally flowing from 
that relationship they owe to plaintiff the higher 
duty of that of a fiduciary because they were both 
officers and directors of plaintiff corporation. They 
owed the utmost loyalty, fairness and good faith 
in their dealings with plaintiff and its business. 
They became dissatisfied with their association with 
plaintiff, but rather than express this in a legally 
acceptab1e fashion, they chose a path calculated to 
cripple if not destroy the plaintiff by seizing iti 
business for themselves. 
When it comes to affixing damages for such 
a wrong must the court look only to whether plain· 
tiff suffered a loss of profits (net) as suggested by 
defendants? The answer is no. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that small closely held corpora· 
tions rarely if ever show a book profit. Their profits 
are customarily represented by the salaries drawn 
by the principal officers and directors. 
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If this court were to look solely to the element 
of loss of net profits in a case such as this where 
a director sets out to cripple his own corporation, 
then the wrong would be acknowledged but the 
wrongdoer would escape unscathed by the payment 
of nominal damages. The terms loyalty, fair deal-
ing and good faith as applied to a corporate direc-
tor would lose all meaning except to legal scholars. 
The courts have wisely adopted an approach de-
signed to protect the corporation from its wrong-
doing directors. The law looks not only to the loss 
sustained by the corporation, but looks with even 
more emphasis upon the gain and unjust enrich-
ment attained by the wrongdoer. 
Liitherland v. Dahlen, 53 A2d 143, (Pa.). 
"It should certainly be unnecessary to state 
once more in detail the principles of law and 
equity governing the duties owed to a corpor-
ation by its directors and officers, for those 
principles have been repeatedly enunciated. 
Suffice it to say that it is well settled; and 
indeed, is embodied in the statutory law of 
the Commonwealth, (Citing statute), that of-
ficers and directors are deemed to stand in a 
fiduciary relation to the corporation. They 
must devote themselves to the corporate affairs 
with a view to promote the common interest 
and not their own, and they cannot, either 
directly or indirectly, utilize their position to 
obtain any personal profit or advantage other 
than that enjoyed by their fellow sharehold-
ers. (Ci ting cases.) In short, there is de-
manded of the officer or director of a corpor-
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ation ~hat he furnish to it his un~ivided loy. 
alty; if there is presented to him an op. 
portunity which is within the scope of its 
own activities. and the pr~sent or potential 
advantage to it, the law will not permit hilll 
to seize the opportunity for himself; if he 
does so, the corporation may elect to claim all 
the benefits of the transaction. Nor is it ma. 
terial that his dealings may not have caused 
a loss or been harmful to the corporation· the 
test of his liability is whether he has un]utly 
gained enrichment." 
See also Craig v. Graphic Arts Studio, Inc., 160 
A2d 444 (Del.) For a leading California case Hall 
v. Dekker, 115 P2d 15 (Cal.) 
In this case the business involved was the whole-
sale floral business. Hall commenced the business in 
1930. In 1930 Dekker was employed to manage the 
Los Angeles branch. In September 1931, he became 
a partner. In November 1934 the business was in· 
corporated and defendant Dekker received stock and 
was elected vice president of the corporation. He 
remained an officer and director through January 
1938. On that date while still an officer and director 
of plaintiff another corporation was organized by 
former employees of the plaintiff and the new cor· 
poration was promoted, and financed by defendant 
Dekker. He solicited business for the new competi· 
tor and obtained orders from plaintiff's customers, 
Defendants contended on appeal that this evidence 
did not state a cause of action against them. The 
court held: 
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"This proposition is untenable ... It is the 
established law that a director or officer of 
a corporation may not enter into a compet-
ing enterprise which cripples or injures the 
business of the corporation of which he is an 
officer or director. (Ci ting cases) . Vice Chan-
cellor Leaming thus accurately states the rule 
in Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris, 
supra, at page 250 of 89 Atlantic, 'It was not 
lawfully possible for the defendant while a 
director and treasurer of complainant cor-
poration to enter into an opposition business 
in his own behalf of such a nature that it 
would cripple or injure the corporation he 
represented." 
This case was followed in a later California 
case of Cavanaugh Nailing Machine Co. v. Cavan-
augh, 334 P2d 954 (Cal.) 
A further statement of the rule is contained 
in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A2d 503 (Del.) 
"If an officer or director of a corporafion, in 
violation of his duty as such, acquires gain 
or advantage for himself, the law charges the 
interest so acquired with a trust for the bene-
fit of the corporation, at its election, while it 
denies to the betrayer all benefits and profit. 
The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in 
its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow 
ground of injury or damage to the corpora-
tion resulting from a betrayal of confidence, 
but upon a broader foundation of a wise pub-
lic policy that, for the purpose of removing 
all temptation extinguishes all possibility 
flowing from a breach of the confidence im-
posed by the fiduciary relation. Given the 
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relation between the parties, a certain result 
follows; and a constructive trust is the remri. 
dial device through which precedence of self 
is compelled to give way to the stern demands 
of loyalty." 
With this principle in mind plaintiff's approach 
to the question of damage is from two standpoints: 
( 1) The value of an advertising account to an 
agency and ( 2) The revenue derived and expected 
from the accounts taken plus the gain to defend.' 
dants and the likelihood that it would continue. 
Mr. Alfred H. Garrigues, a prominent Salt 
Lake City advertising executive testified on plain-
tiff's behalf concerning the value of an account. He 
had had recent occasion to value the accounts in 
his business when it was changed from a partner-
ship to a corporation. His experience was gained 
with his agency management and a great deal of 
reference material ( R. 182). For his purposes he 
assumed an account that had gross annual billing 
of $100,000.00. Customarily an agency would de· 
rive 15 % commission or $15,000.00 gross revenue 
from that account. (Note: The evidence showed that 
the accounts produced $15, 709. 7 4 gross revenue in 
1964 and $17,272.35 in 1963. These figures are 
roughly equivalent to those used by Mr. Garrigues.l 
He first considered that an account would cal'!'). 
with it an acquisition cost. By this he meant the 
time spent in contacting the account and doing 
the research and preparation of material necessary c 
to make a presentation to the client. 
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Mr. Garrigues testified that in his experience 
he would assign a minimum cost of 5 per cent of the 
annual billing of an account to acquisition cost (R. 
183). Assuming, therefore, an annual billing for the 
account of $100,000.00, a minimum acquisition cost 
would be $5, 000. 00. 
Mr. Garrigues next considered that another fac-
tor in evaluating an account was the indoctrination 
cost (R. 190). This was time spent after the initia-
tion of the account necessary to get the account off 
the ground before it became a paying proposition. He 
did not assign any monetary value to a specific 
account involving an annual billing of $100,000.00, 
but nonetheless considered this a valuation problem 
because it represented an unrecovered cost to the 
agency ( R. 191). 
Mr. Garrigues concluded by testifying that a 
third and most important factor is that the account 
would have a value in addition to the acquisition and 
indoctrination cost of between one month's gross 
ie 
at billing and one year's gross revenue. Using an ac-
in count billing $100,000.00 per year, that account 
would have an annual revenue at the customary 15 re 
per cent commission of $15,000.00 and that account 
;,) b" b rs would have an average monthly illing of etween 
$8,000.00 and $9,000.00. Mr. Garrigues would value 
;Jw 
such an account to his agency of $20,000.00 com-ng 
bining the factors of valuation, acquisition, and in-
Lr)' 
doctrination (R. 192-193). 
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The accounts taken by defendants from the 
plaintiff actually had produced during 1963 the 
sum of $17,272.35 and in 1964, the year that they 
were taken from plaintiff, the sum of $15,709.74. 
There is also before the Court the evidence of Mr. 
Hoggan that the total advertising business done by 
a client is most likely to increase over the years, 
(R. 247) 
We turn now to the enrichment or gain enjoyed 
by Mr. Higgins and Mr. Hall from the accounts 
solicited. It should be noted that all of the acquisi-
tion and indoctrination costs that were part of these 
accounts had already been absorbed by the plaintiff. 
and there would be no transitional costs because 
Mr. Hall was already familiar with the accounts as 
he had done their advertising in the past. This is, 
of course, a benefit to defendants. We also note that 
at the time this action was tried in January of 1965, 
approximately 11 months after Mr. Hall left the 
employ of the plaintiff, he was drawing a salary 
from the corporation of Higgins & Hall of $1,250.00 
per month. Necessarily, a good part of that salary, 
if not all of it, would be derived from the work he 
was doing for the accounts that he took from plain· 
tiff (Ex. 3p) & (Ex. 9p). 
The lower court would also have considered a 
likelihood of the accounts remaining with defen· 
dants for some future time. At the time of the trial 
in January, 1965, the accounts had been with the 
defendants for approximately 1 year and each of 
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the accounts expressed a desire and willingness that 
their business stay with the defendants. It is true 
that no one can predict the future, but at least it 
appears from all of the available evidence that the 
gain to defendants in this case would be a continu-
ing one and, of course, a continuin'g loss to the 
plaintiff. 
Again we refer to the Duane Jones case, supra, 
' wherein it is stated: 
"If plaintiff established wrongful conduct by 
defendants as alleged in the Amended Com-
plaint - and the jury found that it did -
it was entitled to recover as damages the 
amount of loss sustained by it, including op-
portunities for profit on the accounts divert-
ed from it through the defendant's conduct 
(Citing cases.) Under the facts here present-
ed, plaintiff's loss was a continuing one ex-
tending at least up to the date of trial. It is 
no answer that the amount of profit plain-
tiff would have made cannot be definitely es-
tablished by proof at the trial. 'There is no 
good reason for requiring any higher degree 
of certainty in respect to the amount of dam-
ages than in respect to any branch of the 
cause. Juries are allowed to act upon probable 
and inferential as well as direct and positive 
proof. And when from the nature of the case 
the damages cannot be estimated by certainty, 
or only a part of them can be so estimated, no 
objection is perceived placing before the jury 
all the facts and circumstances of the case 
having any tendency to show damages or 
their probable amount, so as to enable them 
to make the most intelligible and accurate 
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estimate which the nature of the case will 
permit. ( 1 Southern on Damages [4th Edi-
tion 1916] Section 70) .' " 
In the case of Gould vs. Mountain States Tele. 
phone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah, Utah second 
187, 309 P. 2d 802, this Court stated: 
"The rule against recovery of uncertain dam. 
ages is generally directed against uncertain-
ty with respect to cause rather than to mea-
sure or extent, so that a party who has brok- · 
en his contract will not ordinarily be permit-
ted to escape liability because of uncertainty 
in the amount of damages resulting, and the 
fact that the full extent of damages for breach 
of contract must be a matter of speculation, 
it is not a ground for refusing all damages.'' 
There was no evidence in the Duane Jones case 
(supra) that the damages awarded by the jury were 
based upon loss of net profits from the accounts. 
On the contrary, it appears from a reading of that 
case that the damages were assessed on the basis 
of overall loss to the corporation and gain to the 
defendants by reason of their conspiracy to injure 
c 
t 
a 
the plaintiff corporation and benefit therefrom. The 
11 
fact that the jury verdict was in the even amount · t1 
of $300,000.00 would be indicative of this. 
Plaintiff again states that the measure of dam· 
ages in a case such as this is not especially the loss ii 
to the plaintiff corporation, but rather the gain and fl 
enrichment to defendants. They now have busines~ 
which produced for them gross revenues of over 
$15,000.00 in 1964 and it was reasonable for the ar 
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Court to conclude that they would enjoy these bene-
fits in the future. the judgment of $25,000.00 
awarded to plaintif based upon these elements is 
therefore reasonable and proper. As with other fac-
tual issues, the amount of damages is within the 
province of the trier of fact and should not be dis-
turbed on appeal. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT 
nN ALL MATERIAL ISSUES IN THE CASE. 
The issues before the trial court as set forth 
in the Pre-trial Order were: 
1. Was there a conspiracy between Higgins 
& Hall, while still in the employment of plaintiff? 
2. If there was a conspiracy, did the defen-
dants solicit the plaintiff's accounts while still in 
the employ of plaintiff? 
3. If it is determined that the defendants did 
acquire and solicit, what is the plaintiff's damage? 
4. Further, is the plaintiff entitled to a per-
manent injunction against the defendants? (Plain-
tiff did not seek further injunctive relief at the 
trial.) 
In addition, defendants claimed that damages, 
if any, were not the proximate result of any wrong-
ful conduct on their part (R. 18). 
Without setting forth verbatim the Findings 
1 and Conclusions of the lower court, it is sufficient 
49 
to say that the court fully answered each of the 
issues posed in the Pre-Trial Order and concludeu 
that plaintiff was damaged by the wrongful conduct 
of the defendants. These Findings implicitly cover 
the questions presented in defendants' Brief as to 
damage and proximate cause and, therefore, def en. 
dants' criticism of the lower court's findings is not 
meritorious. 
CONCLUSION 
So far as can be ascertained, this case involv-
ing wrongful solicitation by an account executive 
of an advertising agency is only the second case of 
its kind ever to reach a court of last resort in this 
country. (The Duane Jones case (supra) was the 
first.) The decision of the Court in this case will 
be far reaching in the advertising industry. 
The critical events in this law suit occurred 
between February 13 and February 18, 1964. Mr. 
Hall and Mr. Higgins, both officers and directors 
of the plaintiff corporation, had expressed dissatis· 
faction with their association with plaintiff. Mr 
Higgins elected to terminate and so expressed him· 
self to Mr. Hoggan, the remaining principal in th[ 
corporation on February 13, 1964. Mr. Hall at tha: 
time was undecided. At that time also both defen· 
dants were informed that the accounts then beint 
serviced by Mr. Hall were not his, but belonged t1 
the corporation. Thereafter without informing any 
one, on February 17, 1964 Mr. Hall directly solicitei 
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the advertising business of the accounts he had ser-
\'iced and these accounts transferred their allegi-
ance to him. (Salt Lake Mattress Company which 
had first agreed to go, later decided otherwise). 
When Mr~ Hall had obtained these accounts, he an-
nounced his decision to leave the plaintiff. There-
after both Mr. Higgins and Mr. Hall solicited the 
Wilson Transport Supply account and later in Feb-
ruary, they formed a new corporation entitled Hig-
gins & Hall and this corporation was in business 
March 1, 1964. On February 29, 1964, both defen-
rlants entered the offices of the plaintiff and remov-
ed all the files and records pertaining to these ac-
counts. Still later in April of 1964 while defendants 
were under a Court Restraint, Mr. Hall cancelled a 
13-week KSL-TV contract of plaintiff which he had 
negotiated in February and transferred it to Higgins 
& Hall. 
These acts: Solicitation of plaintiff's custom-
ers; removing plaintiff's files and records; and in-
terferring with the plaintiff's contracts constituted 
a clear violation of the fiduciary duties imposed up-
on defendants as officers and directors of plaintiff 
and were in the very least an attempt to cripple or 
destroy the plaintiff. The lower court so found and 
indeed a contrary finding would be totally unwar-
ranted by the evidence. 
The measure of damages in this case is both 
the loss to the plaintiff and the gain and enrichment 
of defendants. During 1964 these accounts produc-
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ed a gross revenue of over $15,000.00. The judg-
ment of the Court awarding $25,000.00 in damagPs 
to plaintiff is less than two years revenue from the~e 
accounts and the Court also had before it the fm-
ther evidence that defendants were likely to enjoy 
the benefits of this business in the future. Clearly 
the defendants in this case were enriched to that 
extent. 
The judgment of the lower court must be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
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